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Abstract 
 
Carbon dioxide released from the burning of fossil fuels is a major concern of our 
times. There is now a political agreement that these emissions must decrease. So far 
one way forward has been to design and maintain carbon markets. As part of this 
process, trees in the tropics have been enrolled in peculiar transactions: actions such 
as reforesting a land of degraded savannah or preserving a piece of forest can produce 
tradable emission credits to offset against CO2 emissions in distant locations. Based 
on a multi-sited investigation of carbon offsetting, including fieldwork in the Congo, 
the paper presents a journey across different marketization sites where the enrolment 
of forest carbon into market exchanges can be seen to be at stake. Several operations 
are foregrounded, from United Nations negotiations and the measurement of carbon 
stocks, to business venture and legal work. The paper proposes a focus on the 
mundane that attends to details and frictions. This provides a deflationary story of the 
marketization of forest carbon, a story of contingencies and unexpected ramifications. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Carbon dioxide released from the burning of fossil fuels is a major concern of our 
times. Under the impetus of United Nations negotiations on climate change, there is a 
now a widely shared political agreement that these emissions ought to decrease. So 
far, one way forward has been to establish targets limiting the amount of CO2 
collectively emitted and create tradable emission rights. The latter’s scarcity is 
expected to make the release of carbon into the atmosphere costly, at the same time as 
making the reduction of emissions a profitable action. As part of this process, trees in 
the tropics have been enrolled in peculiar transactions: quantities of emissions 
supposedly reduced by interventions such as afforesting a piece of land can be 
exchanged against money to compensate for CO2 emitted elsewhere. The mundane 
market matters of this new type of exchange, commonly referred to as carbon 
offsetting, will be the focus of this paper. 
It has now become frequent to think of global warming in terms of the 
Anthropocene, a word used by geologists to debate whether our planet has entered a 
new age because of mankind’s activity (for a review see Lorimer 2017). Within the 
social sciences, the notion of the Anthropocene triggers discussions pointing out that 
carbon emissions originate from productive activities and globalized market 
exchanges in a highly unequal world. From such a perspective, the development of 
offsetting is the continuance of what Moore (2015) would call the cheapening of 
nature. Cost-effectiveness (achieving a climate target at the lowest cost possible) is 
the main justification for trading CO2 units (Lane 2012), in particular, those derived 
from forestry projects. As we will see in this paper, the latter have consistently tended 
to be considered the cheapest means to reduce emissions, not the least by Stern (2007) 
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in his high-profile report ‘The economics of climate change’. The reliance on trees 
planted in the tropics to absorb CO2 while polluting processes are left untouched 
sounds almost ironic when one has in mind the proposal made by Haraway et al. 
(2016). They suggest that the plantation system (from cotton fields to timber 
plantations) epitomizes the kind of long-distance exploitation that has long been at 
work in Europe’s colonizing enterprises, the slave economy of the United States and 
contemporary capitalistic exchanges of natural resources. Carbon offsetting via 
plantations and other forestry activities seems then to perpetuate this controversial 
history that has caused, among many other problems, global warming. 
Concrete attempts to swap the carbon sequestered through photosynthesis in 
the trunks and roots of trees for the carbon emitted by coal-based power generation, 
for example, have not been left unquestioned. For the environmental activist 
organization Greenpeace (2013), ‘fossil carbon’ and ‘forest carbon’ are simply 
incommensurable. While the latter will eventually circulate into the atmosphere and 
oceans because trees die, the former has formed deeply underground over millions of 
years; releasing this fossil carbon increases the total amount of CO2 exchanged 
aboveground, and only a very limited fraction of this additional quantity can be 
slowly absorbed by the terrestrial bio- sphere. CO2 offsetting through forestry 
activities is therefore not a suitable response to the warming of the Earth. Case studies 
further this critique by documenting specific instances of contentious initiatives in 
places like China, Mexico, or Uganda (e.g. Corbera and Brown 2010, Osborne 2015, 
Nel 2017). Turning forest carbon into tradable emission offsets, it is said, unsettles 
common property rights and encourages privatization and land eviction. It also tends 
to equate trees to biomass and privilege simplistic land use models whose capacity to 
sequester CO2 might be lower than more complex and bio-diverse human-shaped 
ecosystems. Moreover, offsetting projects unequally distribute revenues, either by 
benefiting consultants (who are required to calculate and verify carbon stocks) or by 
leaving behind unfulfilled promises. In a nutshell, selling and buying forest carbon is 
a highly contested activity. 
The empirical and theoretical accounts discussed above consider that 
offsetting is problematic because of what it does to inhabited forested landscapes as 
well as because of what it does not do, like ‘initiating a new historical pathway that 
leads away from the dependence on fossil fuels’ (Lohmann 2010, p. 80). Taking note 
of these critiques, I propose here to ask: when, where, and how exactly is the capacity 
of trees in the tropics to store carbon enrolled in market transactions in the form of 
CO2 offsets? Guided by this question and some of the work done within Science and 
Technology Studies (STS) on markets, the story told in the following pages ought to 
deflate the reach of market exchanges involving forest carbon. These exchanges, I 
suggest, have remained quite marginal, partly due to the disputes they tend to 
provoke, but also because of more discreet resistances such as the unruliness of living 
things and taken-for-granted practicalities failing to materialize. Carbon offsetting is a 
minimal and limited intervention unable to confront the problem of global warming 
caused by industrial processes and land use changes. Yet I would like to suggest that 
this unthreatening appearance may, in fact, have allowed it to contribute to 
establishing carbon emission as a problem. As imperfect, useless, or damaging as one 
may say they are, carbon markets emerged at a time when releasing greenhouse gases 
into the atmosphere was not a political issue, while it may be partly due to these 
markets’ (problematic) existence that carbon emissions have now become a durable 
concern. 
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The approach proposed here to explore carbon offsetting (in particular when it 
involves tropical forests) can be described as a focus on the mundane. The paper will 
examine how these market relations become of the world in specific places and under 
specific circumstances. It will pay attention to the logistics of offsetting, that is, the 
detailed organization and implementation of diverse operations (political negotiations, 
metrological requirements, business practices, and legal infra- structures) through 
which it happens. This focus on the mundane allows us to nuance the effect of, for 
example, a United Nations text creating a market mechanism. This kind of 
announcement participates in making market exchanges of CO2 units a reality, but 
only as an idea, at best a plan, whose concrete realization must be investigated. The 
logistical sensibility employed here thus aims to look at how, where, when, and in 
what form the market relations of carbon offsetting take shape. This provides, I 
suggest, a deflationary story that foregrounds contingency and traces unexpected 
ramifications. 
In the next section, I will discuss a selection of STS work on markets and 
present the empirical research I have conducted. This will allow me to introduce the 
notion of marketization site and further develop what I mean by a focus on the 
mundane. The paper will then move on to the empirical description, organized into 
four sections, each dedicated to a different marketization site, followed by a 
conclusion where I will say a last few words about the friction of the mundane. 
 
A focus on the mundane and its frictions 
 
The theoretical starting point for this enquiry into carbon offsetting is Callon’s work 
on markets, especially when, together with Çalışkan, he suggests considering 
‘markets as arrangements configured during a marketization process’ (Çalışkan and 
Callon 2010, p. 2). Marketization is minimally characterized by the exchange of 
goods and the transfer of ownership against monetary compensations. It involves 
heterogeneous elements (rules, technical objects, calculative tools, texts, knowledge, 
various skills, etc.) and asymmetrical capacities to act, leading sometimes to disputes 
(see also Callon 2007). To approach markets as marketization processes, Çalışkan and 
Callon (2010) provide a series of analytical tools that refer to interrelated operations, 
from ‘pacifying goods’ and ‘marketizing agencies’ to ‘price-setting’ (p. 5). Of 
particular interest for us is the operation they call ‘market design and maintenance’ 
(Çalışkan and Callon 2010, p. 19). Talking about market design reveals that carbon 
offsetting has been invented as an international climate policy and that the question of 
how the exchange of CO2 units can work for this purpose is key. Talking about 
maintenance (or in other words logistics) allows us then to wonder how these 
transactions are effectively accomplished. In offsetting, the design and maintenance 
of market relations are meant to solve a problem: the process of marketization 
responds to a certain way of defining what is problematic with global warming and, as 
suggested in the introduction, this conception of the problem has been extensively 
questioned (cf. Callon 2009). 
To organize my analysis of the enrolment of trees in offsetting exchanges, I 
propose to delimit several marketization sites in which the problematization activity 
described above can be witnessed. The paper will take us to specific places and times 
where and when the marketization of forest carbon has been at stake, namely United 
Nations negotiation sessions, a plantation in the Congolese savannah, and the ministry 
of environment in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo. These marketization 
sites are narrative artefacts that help me render a multi-located fieldwork investigation 
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whose geographical and thematic displacements were driven by the multivalence of 
the issue under scrutiny. From 2010 to 2013, I constituted a substantial documentation 
on carbon markets (UN texts, various reports, press releases, academic articles, etc.) 
and carried out interviews (around 60) with a large range of stakeholders. I also 
conducted observations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (in Kinshasa, within 
the ministry of environment for six weeks, and during a field trip to the savannah), 
and at United Nations climate negotiations in Durban, South Africa. Organizing the 
empirical narration of this paper into marketization sites allows me to put forward 
multiple operations (political negotiations, metrological requirements, business 
practices, and legal infrastructures) that are mobilized for offsetting to happen and 
whose details matter to the (problematic) accomplishment of marketization. 
Paying attention to details through a kind of logistical sensibility is precisely 
how MacKenzie (2009a, 2009b) documents the emergence of markets trading CO2 
units, such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol. The 
Kyoto Protocol is an international treaty, through which wealthy nations committed to 
comply with emission targets. The text created two kinds of carbon market that would 
help them to do so. The first type is a cap-and-trade system, whereby the total 
emission cap is translated into emission allowances that can be sold by governments 
expecting to emit less than their target to those expecting to exceed it (on the 
European adaptation of this system, see MacKenzie 2009a). The second type of 
market, to which the CDM belongs, is project-based offsetting. Emission credits are 
generated by projects whose implementation leads to a reduction in emission levels 
compared to business-as-usual. The Kyoto Protocol allows wealthy countries to meet 
their cap by importing emission credits obtained from such activities located in 
developing countries (including, under specific conditions, planting trees). With 
regard to the CDM, MacKenzie (2009b) wonders how equivalence, a priori justified 
by the global nature of CO2, is practically established between a power generator in 
Scotland buying emission credits and a modernized chemical plant in China selling 
these credits. He shows that a series of devices and calculations are involved in 
translating both activities into the same unit, tonnes of CO2, either emitted by fuel 
combustion or reduced by the treatment of exhaust gas. In particular, MacKenzie 
examines a scientific equation used to convert trifluoromethane, a greenhouse gas 
released during the production of refrigerants, into CO2 equivalents based on the 
comparative climatic impacts of the two gases. By computing that one tonne of 
trifluoromethane equates to 11,7000 tonnes of CO2, the formula has made the sale of 
emission credits from the treatment of trifluoromethane exhaust (and subsequent 
emission reductions) in the Chinese and Indian refrigerant industry a very lucrative 
business (see Bryant et al. 2015). The calculative technicality, which produces taken-
for-granted numerical values, happens to be an important market matter, a detail that 
creates profit-making opportunities and triggers investment decisions. 
MacKenzie’s (2009b) engagement with carbon offsetting is mainly restricted 
to measurement devices that are derived from the climate sciences and form the basis 
for quantifying emissions and give an existence to the new object of exchange. We 
too will encounter such black-boxed metro- logical resources. But instead of focusing 
on one formula, which then appears as the cornerstone of the whole market, carbon 
offsetting will be approached in this paper by attending to a plurality of details, such 
as disputed words in a United Nations decision, cash flow estimates, trees growing 
slower than expected, and moral judgments about corruption. A parallel can be drawn 
with Barry’s (2013) work on the construction of a pipeline in Georgia. His account of 
this infrastructural project involves, among other things, compensation rules, art-
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activist campaigning, experiments assessing the impact of construction traffic, and 
debates over the properties of the coating material. To describe his approach, Barry 
talks about ‘the study of material politics’, understood as ‘a commitment to a certain 
form of empiricism, one that requires us to attend at once to the specificity of 
materials, to the contingencies of physical geography, the tendencies of history and 
the force of political action’ (Barry 2013, p. 183). Talking of the mundane to examine 
the enrolment of forest carbon in offsetting, as proposed here, amounts to a similar 
move. 
This focus on the mundane will point to details that help shape and maintain 
the possibility of exchanging carbon offsets but tend to be overlooked, because at first 
sight they look negligible. More- over, given its other meaning – the mundane as that 
which is of this earthly world – the term sounds particularly relevant to interventions 
set up in response to the warming of the Earth and which should, therefore, seek to 
transform how human societies engage with other earthly things. In particular, the 
paper will examine an offsetting project taking the form of a plantation of acacias, a 
group of species to which, funnily enough, Haraway (2016) dedicates one of her 
stories meant to make us think of how to better live and die on a damaged planet (or 
in the Anthropocene). Haraway’s story explains in great detail how acacia trees and 
ants help each other reproduce, showing ‘species in all their complexities and 
ongoingness [that] do great harm and sustain whole worlds, sometimes in association 
with human people, sometimes not’ (p. 125). The story told by this paper will mostly 
be about people and artefacts, and we will see acacia trees being planted in neat rows 
to serve the purpose of absorbing CO2 released by human productive activities. The 
enrolment of trees in offset- ting seems to sustain a mode of engagement with earthly 
things that treats the latter as resources. This form of exploitation is quite ordinary in 
many places of our contemporary world (cf. the plantation system, Haraway et al. 
2016). A focus on the mundane means, then, attending to such habits and developing 
a logistical sensibility to get closer to the details of their enactment. 
The process of marketization described here is not a success story, but a series 
of frictions. The term friction has been coined by Tsing (2005), for whom it is the 
modality of globalization; it is through misunderstandings and local adaptations that 
connections ‘across distance and difference’ are established. In this paper, the term 
friction will also highlight the vulnerability of a series of action meant to address 
global warming, constrained by a certain reluctance to change (the habit to burn fossil 
fuels) and various sorts of disruptions, including the unruliness of acacias trees. This 
focus on the mundane and its frictions, as well as the possibility to take stock of more 
than 20 years of carbon offsetting, will nuance the enthusiasm of Callon (2009) when 
he refers to the marketization of CO2 as ‘ongoing collective experiment’. A trial and 
error dynamic can be identified in the evolution of United Nations negotiations about 
whether or not to rely on trees in the tropics to store carbon. But the process seems to 
lack the reflexivity required to acknowledge that offsetting might just not be how to 
seriously act on carbon emissions. In what follows, the marketization of forest carbon 
will be told as a story of contingencies and unexpected ramifications. This story aims 
to give a glimpse of the resistance of our world towards the changes that the warming 
of the Earth, the warnings of climatologists, and the Anthropocene debate are calling 
for. This resistance is what I call the friction of the mundane. 
 
Marketization site 1: disputes at UN negotiations 
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In the late 1980s, the consolidation of scientific facts about the warming of the Earth 
triggered a process of collective decision-making under the aegis of the United 
Nations (UN) (see Edwards 2010). Early on, devising market arrangements emerged 
as a way forward to reduce emissions. CO2 units would be quantified, desired, and 
exchanged because of a political will formulated through the diplomatic construct of 
sovereign nations, ranked according to their income and brought together as an 
assembly of delegates. Here I suggest that UN negotiations provide a good opening 
for a story that seeks to situate how, and through which geopolitical circumstances, 
carbon markets started being of this world, emerging from a recent past, when 
emitting CO2 without restriction was unproblematic. 
In the early 1990s, as the foundational text of climate diplomacy (the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) was being negotiated, it was 
clear that the responsibility for addressing global warming would fall on wealthy, 
post-industrial economies. Yet implementing interventions in developing countries to 
offset against CO2 emitted by developed countries became a topic of discussion 
(Bodansky 1993, Grubb et al. 1993). Some delegations, from the United States and 
Nor- way notably, fervently advocated for this new kind of transaction. The motive 
was grounded in a cost minimizing logic building on international asymmetries. The 
cost of reducing one tonne of CO2 through plantations in Costa Rica, for example, 
was assumed to be lower than transforming the Norwegian oil extraction industry. 
The rationale was that, from the vantage point of the global climate, no matter where 
on the Earth CO2 is emitted or absorbed, it should be possible for highly emitting 
activities to partially relocate their effort by financing distant reductions. Moreover, 
scientific statements for policy makers, including by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, expected biological carbon sinks to provide low-cost credits (Brown 
et al. 1996). Trees in the tropics could be treated as ‘cheap nature’ in this new way 
(cf. Moore 2015). But many delegations from countries supposed to host this new 
productive activity rejected the idea. Offsetting, they argued, would prioritize CO2 
reductions instead of local needs, take advantage of the cheapest domains of climate 
action, and allow rich nations to escape their obligations and not tackle the problem 
they have caused. Negotiators from both sides eventually settled on a pilot phase to 
test the controversial principle already implemented in a few voluntary initiatives 
(Moura-Costa and Stuart 1998). Most offsetting initiatives launched during the 1990s 
were forestry projects in Latin America, which involved North American 
conservation organizations and energy companies but often lacked the metrological 
and calculative tools to enact market exchanges. 
In the early days of UN negotiations, the marketization of forest carbon 
existed in an aspirational form. Although the idea was contentious, the possibility of 
producing and exchanging CO2 credits acquired a more solid existence in a 
negotiation twist during the writing of the Kyoto Protocol (Grubb et al. 1999, 
Werksman 1998). Discussions on the treaty’s text had begun several months in 
advance of the decision-making session scheduled for the end of 1997, with 
delegations circulating public proposals and participating in ad hoc encounters. One 
proposal, from the Brazilian government, contained a provision for levying fines on 
developed countries not complying with their emission targets (see the introduction); 
the fines would be pooled into a Clean Development Fund to finance climate-friendly 
actions in developing countries, up to an amount indexed on the emission reductions 
they would achieve. While the latter’s negotiators supported the suggestion, 
delegations of the former rejected it, as it could be expected. The matter seemed 
helpless; the positions were too polarized. Yet to a few delegates it gradually 
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appeared that the emission reductions achieved by projects benefitting from the fund’s 
support could match the quantity of CO2 liberated beyond the tar- gets. This new 
understanding made the Brazilian idea resemble the offsetting option actively 
supported by United States negotiators. As the negotiation deadline came closer, the 
possibility for wealthy economies to invest in development projects saving emissions 
abroad was presented as helping domestic compliance and the penalty aspect was 
dropped. On paper, the word Fund was eventually replaced by Mechanism, giving 
birth to what would progressively develop into an operational offsetting market. 
UN negotiations in the 1990s contributed to make global warming a matter of 
concern and established a past when it was not so. The timelessness of the 
dependency on fossil fuels of con- temporary Western democracies was over, though 
this past time seemed reluctant to pass. By authorizing excess emissions and lowering 
their cost through carbon trading, the Kyoto Protocol almost ensured that in the short 
term not much would change (cf. Lohmann 2010). The capacity of markets to act on 
gains and losses aimed to soften the new constraint. In particular, the CDM, which at 
the time was being referred to as the ‘Kyoto surprise’ (Werksman 1998), permitted a 
geo- graphical distribution of the emission reduction effort (and its cost) via 
exchangeable credits translating how much a given action reduces CO2 compared to a 
baseline that would have supposedly occurred without the intervention. With such a 
convoluted counterfactual reasoning, the market would have a limited (if debatable, 
see Lohmann 2005) effect on the atmospheric concentration of CO2, but it would 
make the issue circulate, including to places like the Congo where emission levels had 
always been low. 
If planting and conserving trees in the tropics were widely considered cost-
effective actions to reduce CO2, forestry activities ended up with a marginal role in 
the CDM. When delegates started discussing operational rules to flesh out the new 
market, national representatives (e.g. from Brazil, the European Union, China), 
together with environmental activists, resisted the marketization of forest carbon (Fry 
2002). Beside a persisting wariness towards offsetting, forest carbon was described as 
unsuitable, because the storage of CO2 is non-permanent. Another concern was the 
fear that given its low cost, forest carbon would flood the market with credits, 
depriving more expensive projects from investors and buyers. Moreover, crediting 
actions such as the conservation of an area threatened by deforestation was said to be 
flawed, because the logging or agricultural activity threatening the place could easily 
relocate elsewhere (a phenomenon called leakage). Finally, the interventions’ 
potential scale was perceived as impeaching national sovereignty over a territory and 
its development prospects (via the unlimited exploitation of timber and land). In 2003, 
after years of textual battles in international conference centres, the conditions under 
which forests could participate in the CDM were agreed on, and only plantation was 
allowed (Fry 2007). Negotiators also decided that due to the short-lived existence of 
trees, emissions credits from forestry projects would be temporary. A government 
buying these credits would need to later replace them. In this market that ‘makes 
things the same’ (MacKenzie 2009b), forest carbon had a special status that made its 
rather unattractive. When in 2005 European decision-makers launched a cap-and-
trade scheme to translate national commitments (of the Kyoto Protocol) into a law 
regulating power generation and industrial production (see MacKenzie 2009a), they 
authorized the regulated installations to buy units from the CDM to meet their 
emission levels, except for temporary credits. The ban was consequential; Europe 
constituted the main demand for offsets after 2001, when the newly elected President 
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of the United States withdrew from the Kyoto treaty to continue emitting CO2 
unrestrictedly. 
So the story begins with UN negotiations focused on devising a market to 
respond to a new political injunction (reducing CO2 emissions). The possibility to 
compensate for what a nation or an industrial installation emits through distant 
emission reduction actions shows a certain inertia exerted by a recent past when 
global warming was not an issue. While we saw that trees in the tropics were meant to 
have a bright future in the emerging UN offset market, several political twists took 
place within and beyond UN negotiations and put forest carbon at the margins. As a 
result, in the CDM online database managed by UN secretariat, only 71 forestry 
projects have been registered as of June 2017, representing 0.8% of all interventions 
and 0.6% of issued credits.1 To further explore this marginal market segment, we will 
now turn to one of such projects and attend to its own frictions. 
 
Marketization site 2: acacia trees in the savannah 
 
Our second marketization site is a forestry project added to the CDM database in 
2011 and located in the Congolese savannah 150 kilometres north-east of the 
country’s capital. There, acacias trees have been interwoven with crops to produce 
and sell charcoal and cassava flour in Kinshasa, and emission credits compensating 
for CO2 emitted far away, in Europe. As we move from a historical perspective on 
UN negotiations to the practical set up of an offsetting activity, the metrological and 
economic conditions of the marketization of forest carbon in a specific place can be 
unpacked. New frictions become witness-able, from the stubbornness of procedural 
details to the unruliness of living trees. 
To be a CDM project, the plantation owned and managed by a family business 
has had to navigate a series of exigencies. Within UN negotiations, once agreement 
had been reached on the restrictive legibility of forestry activity in the new market (cf. 
above), more precise rules gradually emerged as projects were proposed, assessed by 
independent auditors, accepted, and registered by the CDM board (the market 
authority composed of delegates of various nationalities). The Congolese enterprise 
had to hire the help of a French consultancy firm to shape its project accordingly, 
gather evidential material, and fill the required paperwork. This is when a baseline is 
established, which represents the emission level that would have occurred in the 
absence of the project. Here, the pro- posed baseline was the perpetuation of the state 
of the land in the late 2000s, a grassy savannah barely inhabited and regularly 
degraded by bushfires (see Ehrenstein and Muniesa 2013). But the requirements of 
the CDM concern other aspects of the activity as well. The zone to be reforested had 
to be geolocalized, property rights demonstrated, the place described (climate, soil, 
vegetation, etc.), the tree species specified, the plantation calendar projected over the 
lifetime of the activity (30 years), and the carbon stock accumulated annually 
estimated. Such operations prepare for a spatial and temporal containment, based on 
which emission credits might be produced electronically and assigned to the 
plantation owner (see Lansing 2012). This would occur during the project’s 
implementation, when auditors come to verify the calculation of carbon stocks in 
accordance with techniques (sampling procedures, etc.) already anticipated at the 
registration stage. 
In the market design of the CDM, a fundamental exigency is geographical. 
The land to be af/reforested should not be a forest, with ‘forest’ defined according to 
three criteria: a minimum surface, minimum canopy coverage, and minimum tree 
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height. We are miles away here from how forests might be experienced by people 
who live in and with them (see Tsing 2005) or described and under- stood by 
ecologists. Within UN negotiations, articulating a single common definition had been 
hard. Eventually all delegates agreed to adapt the one already used by the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation in its survey of productive forests (Fry 2002). Based on a 
simplistic but institutionalized and easily actionable concept of forest, negotiators 
then defined afforestation as land switching from being in a state of non-forest since 
1960 to a state of forest. The activity in the Congo was initially presented as such, and 
visual evidence from the past was needed to prove that the region had been a grassy 
land for a while. But as no relevant evidence from colonial times seemed to exist, the 
issue delayed registration for months. A solution was eventually found by renaming 
the activity reforestation. This lowered the evidential requirement regarding the state 
of the land that should be non-forest since 1990 only, a date for which NASA satellite 
images could easily be retrieved. Many details, negligible at first sight, must be 
attended to in order to enable the marketization of forest carbon. 
Each CDM project is a priori unique, situated in a particular landscape, shaped 
by specific factors. The savannah along the Congo River is certainly very different 
from the Colombian mountains hosting another forestry project registered the same 
year. But the procedures governing this peculiar market tend to encourage 
reproduction rather than silvicultural innovation. As only plantations are authorized 
and project developers must make sure they have the metrological tools to anticipate 
and measure carbon stocks, well-known species in simple designs (monocultures) 
might be preferred over more complicated ecosystems. The project examined here is 
actually a copy of a nearby charcoal-producing plantation financed since the late 
1980s by European overseas aid, and the equations used to quantify its carbon stock 
are borrowed from the work on acacias’ productivity conducted by French 
agronomists in the region during the 1990s. Offsetting does not occur in a vacuum; 
the new market arrangement is shaped by localized legacies from anterior actions and 
other market activities (cf. Lovell and MacKenzie 2015). The CDM rules organize 
what Barry (2013) would call an ‘informational enrichment’ of the planted trees 
oriented towards their control and the quantification of their carbon. The acacias 
plantation is thus conceived, at least on paper, to generate ‘passive goods’ (Çalışkan 
and Callon, 2010, p. 5). 
To describe the circumstances in which forest carbon can be marketized, 
attending to metrological demands is not enough and the vagaries of business must 
also be considered. For the owner of the acacias plantation, selling offsets was not an 
end, only a means. In the mid-1990s, he left Brussels and his teaching position in 
agronomy to revive the family enterprise in Kinshasa. But the economic and political 
crisis affecting the Congo that led to the 1998–2002 war put the ambition on hold. 
When the country eventually underwent pacification under the UN umbrella, it was 
still difficult to raise capital at a reasonable interest rate. Despite its requirements and 
associated costs (e.g. consultants, audits), the CDM appeared as a resource to make 
the activity more attractive by modifying its business plan and adding an income 
stream. To fit what Muniesa et al. (2017) call the ‘the logic of capitalization’, the 
enterprise would commercialize cassava flour in the short term and charcoal in the 
long term. Meanwhile 1 million tonnes of CO2 would be sold to reimburse loans 
provided by Belgian investors. For them, the project became valuable when it secured 
two forward sales of emission credits. The sales contracts were passed in 2009 with a 
World Bank fund and a French private bank, and they referred to calculations based 
on generic growth rates for acacias in a tropical climate (500,000 tonnes of CO2 each 
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delivered by 2017). In both cases the price was 4 dollars per tonne. Given the 
European ban on temporary credits, willingness to pay for temporary credits was rare 
and varied. The World Bank had pooled financial contributions and issued purchase 
contracts with two-dozen projects in a diplomatic move, probably to show that 
developed economies finance forestry activities in poor countries. As for the private 
bank, it aimed to resell the credits to companies interested in offsets for marketing 
purposes. In parallel to the CDM but outside the scope of UN negotiations, voluntary 
certification was emerging wherein forestry projects were appreciated for the nice 
stories they sold alongside CO2 units (Diaz et al. 2011). As Çalışkan and Callon 
(2010) remind us, markets are sites of power asymmetries and the bargaining capacity 
of the plantation’s owner was rather weak here. 
The offsetting project became of the world at the junction of many 
transactions with different temporalities and spatial extensions. The articulation and 
fulfilment of these various promises relied on the capacity of trees to absorb CO2 as 
monitored by the metrological tools of the offsetting market. In the Congolese 
savannah in the early 2010s, the carbon stored in the planted trees started to be 
quantified, while bags of flour were routinely transported to Kinshasa and the project 
developer was prospecting for kiln equipment. When the measurement’s preliminary 
results came out, they were much lower than expected. They were even negative due 
to a metrological convention of the CDM that required counting the removal of the 
savannah vegetation during land preparation as CO2 emissions. The bad performance 
of the plantation compared to projections was explained by uneven working rhythms 
and the unexpected behaviour of acacia trees, which had grown slower and died more 
often than what the generic rates involved in the ex ante estimate had anticipated. But 
the details of their local existence in relation to the soil, its insects, and the climate 
were not investigated. Rather, the financial montage of the project was modified. The 
discrepancy threatened the future of the plantation and for the venture to hold up, at 
least a little longer, its market ambition had to be drastically reduced. Adjustments 
like prepayment, volume renegotiation, and forms of non-market support (aid grants) 
were needed to cope with the uncertainty resulting from the encounter of market 
promises, rigid calculative tools, and unruly trees. 
The marketization of forest carbon in a specific place (the Congolese 
savannah) involves metrological and business operations potentially impaired by the 
ability of earthly things not to behave as needed to fulfil promised exchanges. In the 
bureaucratic turmoil of the CDM, the material existence of acacias on savannah soil 
had been neglected. The unpredictability of life had already been alluded to in UN 
negotiations with the debate about the non-permanence of carbon storage in forests. 
Here, this friction could unravel the long-distance transaction of CO2 offsets carefully 
prepared in paperwork and contracts and make a local business bankrupt. Browsing 
the CDM database, one finds that many forestry projects seem to have remained 
unable to claim emission credits, and for others, the certified amount is often much 
lower than what had been projected. For the global climate, the CO2 absorbed by the 
few additional trees planted in the tropics via the emerging carbon market is mere 
noise. Yet as we continue moving in time and across space to map out the marginal 
marketization of forest carbon, the events told so far will acquire new ramifications. 
 
Marketization site 3: back to UN negotiations 
 
Within UN negotiations, the dispute on offsetting and trees in the tropics did not end 
with the creation of the CDM and its restrictive conditions for forestry activities. UN 
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decision-making on climate change is an iterative process and new topics can emerge. 
This was the case of REDD+, a set of rules in discussion from 2005 to 2013 whose 
purpose was to incite the reduction of CO2 emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation in the tropics2. Our story thus comes back to the first marketization site, 
UN negotiations, but now a decade after the Kyoto Protocol. This return allows us to 
examine how the marketization of forest carbon resurfaced, shaped again by past, 
unquestioned choices and assumptions, as well as by the intrusion of novel concerns 
provoked by further extending the UN-driven emission reduction effort to developing 
nations. 
REDD+ started with a proposal put forward in 2005 by a small group of 
delegations, led by Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea (UNFCCC 2005). The text 
emphasized the amount of emissions caused by tropical deforestation according to 
state-of-the-art-expertise (15 – 20% of worldwide CO2 emissions in the 1990s) and 
suggested the establishment of a new mechanism or the amendment of the CDM. The 
reason for forest loss, it was argued, was a lack of financial revenue derived from 
keeping trees in the tropics standing. CO2 offsets used by developed nations for 
compliance with their Kyoto targets could provide the missing incentive. The 
proposal acknowledged the CDM controversy by introducing an important change: 
the action would be in the hand of nations, with deforestation and emission levels 
calculated across national territories and offsets sold by national governments (cf. the 
sovereignty and leakage arguments described above). The gist of the proposal, the 
creation of a new negotiation topic, was accepted in 2007, including by Brazilian 
negotiators whose new disposition to discuss how emissions from forest loss could be 
limited was attributed to a recent decline of the country’s deforestation rate (Fearnside 
2013). 
From one negotiation session to the other, REDD+ was charged up with 
various objectives (La Viña and de Leon 2014, UNFCCC 2014). Delegates agreed 
that beside deforestation, other actions could be targeted, such as forest degradation. 
Trees in the tropics were seen as more than carbon sticks now, and the protection of 
biodiversity was mentioned in a list of safeguards. Moreover, African delegations 
became active negotiators. Most of these countries represented the poorest nations of 
the world, highly dependent on overseas aid. REDD+ had to accommodate their 
problems and aspirations. For example, while it was initially thought that to calculate 
reduced emission levels, past deforestation rates would be used as baselines, African 
delegates argued for adjustments. These would anticipate a future development of 
their economies and allow for the legitimate increase of the exploitation of wood and 
land. Another of their requests concerned REDD+ metrological exigencies, which had 
to be loosened when it appeared that an operation as simple as measuring forest cover 
would be a challenge in places lacking reliable electricity supply and an efficient 
Internet. The Congolese forestry administration was such a place, physically unable to 
receive satellite images sent by foreign partners given the digital weight of the data. 
Two different mundane constraints are witnessed here: first, a developmentalist 
attitude bequeathed by past habits when preserving the environment was not an issue, 
and second, the absence in some parts of the world of infrastructures whose 
omnipresence is taken for granted from the vantage point of wealthy countries. 
In place of offsetting rules attuned to deforestation, what REDD+ was meant 
to be became more vague but also more encompassing. A kind of learning by doing 
was made possible by the rhythm of UN negotiations, wherein decision-making 
amounted to a ‘series of rendezvous’, to quote Callon et al. (2009). With REDD+ 
activities simultaneously initiated on the ground (see below), it could almost be said 
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that negotiators were participating in an ‘ongoing collective experiment’ (cf. Callon 
2009). But the experiment lacked reflexivity, and certain ideas were continuously left 
unquestioned. For example, as mentioned in the introduction above, the low cost of 
CO2 reductions from forestry activities was reasserted in the influential 2006 Stern 
review, bringing REDD+ to the attention of an international audience. Yet the claim 
remained unproven; it built on the assumption that land is cheap in nations with low 
incomes and ignored the difficulties (e.g. transactions costs, financial risks) 
encountered by forestry activities in the CDM. Another unquestioned idea was that 
governments would react to incentives as rational market agents, and new revenues 
could easily induce large-scale land use change (a point made in Karsenty and Ongolo 
2012). Unlike the economists involved in the European cap-and-trade studied by 
MacKenzie (2009a), here the behavioural precept was not part of a broader, evolving 
theoretical apparatus; it was only a self-evident assumption. 
What was, however, hotly debated was whether incentives to decrease 
deforestation and CO2 emissions could come from a demand for offsets. Within UN 
negotiations, the marketization dispute thus continued. In 2010, negotiators agreed 
that at the following iteration (the 2011 session in Durban), they would explore 
financing options (UNFCCC 2014). No choice had to be made, yet simply listing 
options already proved controversial. A balanced wording was eventually found that 
appeased the main opponents (Brazil versus Papua New Guinea) and their allies by 
equally acknowledging both market and non-market options without further 
specifications. As unspectacular as it might seem, this result almost did not happen. 
At the last minute, a delegation (Australia) asked for introducing one additional word 
in the two-page text. The modification would come to matter if several future 
developments took place: if some jurisdictions (local, national, regional) unilaterally 
created their own markets involving REDD+-like actions, and if UN negotiations 
established a REDD+ market, then CO2 units traded in the former arrangement could 
be de facto recognized in the latter. The demand triggered an outcry and was 
eventually dropped. Many negotiators strongly disagreed with the de facto linkage 
that would weaken the role of UN negotiations in providing the main space where the 
marketization of forest carbon can be problematized. More importantly, the request 
felt inappropriate, because there was not enough negotiation time to consider its 
implications. Making carbon markets a reality depends on contingent events (e.g. a 
new US President) and the management of a negotiation. UN sessions are organized 
into small groups of well-acquainted delegates specialized in a topic. Beside 
routinized writing practices (see Riles 2001), their interactions are governed by a 
certain deontology. One word added in a carefully composed compromise, even if its 
consequences are hypothetical, is a disruption that contravenes delegates’ disposition 
to negotiate. This kind of decisional modality matters to understand the (un)making of 
carbon markets, and the surprise of the CDM related earlier in the paper had happened 
partly by tinkering with words. 
In 2013, negotiators finalized the Framework for REDD+, a verification 
procedure to which the measurement and calculation of forest-related emission 
reductions could be submitted on a voluntary basis (UNFCCC 2014). It amounted to 
guidance rather than a mechanism able to generate a demand for CO2 units and 
regulate transactions. Within UN negotiations, the Framework was a stand-alone set 
of decisions, disconnected from topics like the renewal of Kyoto commitments. 
REDD+ seems actually to have pioneered a new kind of action, organized in an ad 
hoc manner, able to enrol countries whose emissions had never been frontally 
addressed until then. This approach can be found in the 2015 Paris Agreement 
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wherein all nations agreed to a collective effort through unilaterally decided and only 
partially quantified commitments. The revival of forest carbon via REDD+ 
participated in moving beyond CO2 quantification and a rigid international 
categorization legated from past times when minimal market arrangements seemed 
enough. 
Forest carbon resurfaced in UN negotiations in the mid-2000s, an episode that 
demonstrated how details (one word in a two-page text) and the legacy of the 
negotiations intervene in consensus-based decision-making whose iterative mode 
preserves traces of previous debates. The idea of tackling global warming via the 
trading of CO2 units remained controversial. I even suggest that it started to appear 
out of date, though as we shall see next, the loose scope of REDD+ allowed actors to 
pursue accommodating market exchanges at its margins. As our story unfolds, 
marketization becomes drawn into new relations: when in the Kyoto Protocol, offsets 
from trees in the tropics aimed to serve wealthy nations, REDD+ put developing 
nations and their needs centre stage. This extension of the emission reduction effort to 
parts of the world different from Western settings, points to frictions of a new kind 
(cf. lack of infrastructure) that will be further examined below. 
 
Marketization site 4: in the Congolese ministry of environment 
 
After tracing the emergence of carbon markets, examining the set up of a plantation 
supposed to generate CO2 offsets, and returning to UN negotiations when 
marketization (more precisely offsetting) seemed out of fashion, I now propose to 
attend to a last marketization site, the ministry of environment of the Congo. In the 
late 2000s, its ministerial staff had barely heard of carbon markets, and it was the 
owner of the acacia plantation previously examined who introduced them to the topic. 
A few years later, foreign consultants paid by overseas aid were working for the 
ministry to make REDD+ happen in the country. One focus of their activity was the 
possibility of offsets exchanges. By looking into the ordinary (dis)functioning of the 
Congolese state, the exploration of how, when, and where carbon markets are 
designed and maintained continues in a new direction, around a legal intervention that 
will reveal the local absence of a market morality assumed to be universally desired. 
Since 2010, the Congolese ministry of environment had benefitted from so-
called readiness grants provided by aid programmes managed through multilateral 
organizations like the World Bank and the United Nations Development Fund 
(MECNT 2010). The funding supported the activity of a temporary entity advising the 
ministry, a focal point for REDD+, whose staff included a few international 
consultants. These young expatriates had good relational skills but no scientific 
expertise per se; their task was that of project managers. They were, for example, in 
contact with foreign research centres, which had the knowledge and equipment to 
measure and study the dynamic of the Congo’s forest cover. The consultants spent a 
lot of time organizing meetings in Kinshasa to promote the idea that forest carbon 
mattered and attending meetings abroad to present the country’s REDD+ 
accomplishments to donor representatives. This advocacy was supplemented by more 
tangible preparatory interventions such as legal work on the possibility for the country 
to welcome and supervise voluntary offsetting projects. 
Indeed, with REDD+, the possibility of protecting a small piece of forest from 
deforestation had unexpectedly received a new impulse. If the decisions gradually 
emerging from UN negotiations did not establish a project-based market, in 2009, 
delegates agreed, after fierce debate, that in the short-term countries might host 
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subnational REDD+ actions (UNFCCC 2014). The marketization of forest carbon 
was sticking around, but now beyond the oversight of UN authority. It was becoming 
the realm of private certification schemes proposing metrological tools to calculate 
emission reductions from forest conservation and rehabilitation projects, rules applied 
by nature conservancy organizations to supply buyers like airline companies with 
CO2 offsets (Diaz et al. 2011). Voluntary REDD+ emission credits were issued across 
the world, including by interventions that two decades before had been part of the 
UN-driven pilot phase for offsetting and then considered ineligible under the CDM. In 
the Congo too, a market version of REDD+ was making its way. In 2011, a Canadian 
organization obtained a ministerial approval to carry out a project in a former logging 
concession and other initiatives were talked about. 
The Congo is a country whose territory contains large quantities of various 
minerals generating a rentiership economy. Forest carbon was treated as yet another 
resource (cf. ‘cheap nature’, Moore 2015). Given the forest’s immensity, tracking the 
use of this resource through offsetting would be a struggle for the central 
administration. To address the situation, the consultants of the ministry of 
environment envisioned a legal process that would screen and authorize projects 
carried out in the Congolese forests. As shown by Mitchell (2011) for oil fields, legal 
(and physical) access can make a natural resource an object of investment and 
consumption, or of speculation and private (rather than collective) enrichment. Here, 
the consultants aimed to ensure a collectively beneficiary marketization process by 
avoiding dubious deals between individuals acquiring rights for land speculation and 
ministry officials handing them for bribes. Due diligence would be conducted upfront 
and externally to keep at bay fraudulent business. Project developers would then 
obtain from the ministry an agreement to exploit the carbon of a given area 
conditional to submitting the activity to one of the certification schemes evoked above 
within a fixed delay. This decision would be made by a Kinshasa-based committee, 
including civil servants and representatives of environmental and human rights 
organizations. To incite this committee not to delay the processing of applications (a 
technique usually used to obtain bribes), fees paid by project developers would be 
redistributed to committee members only if they complied with fixed deadlines. 
Finally, the projects’ documentation and committee meetings’ minutes would be 
available online. 
Looking into the practicalities (e.g. fees, deadlines) of legal access casts light 
on the moral expectations around an essential step of the marketization process. In an 
audit-type report for the Norwegian aid agency (a major donor to REDD+ actions 
worldwide), corruption defined as the use of entrusted power for private gain was said 
to be pervasive in the Congo – a way of life, a rampant disease (PWC 2011). The 
report, whose naturalized conception of corruption is contestable, nevertheless reveals 
the assumptions apparently shared by donors and investors that REDD+ ought to 
involve some sort of idealized accountable state and ethical business. The universal 
adoption of these moral references seems to be unquestionably desirable for the 
marketization of forest carbon (as in oil exploitation, cf. Weszkalnys 2011, Barry 
2013, and local development projects, cf. Li 2007). This is not the kind of ‘response-
able naturecultures inhabited by accountable companion species’ advocated by 
Haraway (2016), where attention is paid to the way earthly things ‘sustain whole 
worlds’ (p. 125). The consultants devised a response to the climate of suspicion and 
condemnation surrounding Congolese economic and political life, not the extractive 
use of the new natural resource. In the procedure to allocate rights over forest carbon, 
decision-makers were supposed not to seek opaque inducements by the provision of 
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legitimate payment under public scrutiny. But this scrutiny was missing. The 
consultants had expected local civil society organizations – motivated by concern 
about the issue of governance – to drive enforcement. It turned out they were not. The 
legal intervention did not face opposition, just the indifference of a public too busy 
advocating for other long-standing causes, like the translation into state law of the 
customary ownership of forest land. In Kinshasa, activists’ concerns were not aligned 
with the supposedly universal morality assumed by overseas donors. 
The Congo is a place where elections are contested, civil servants barely paid, 
law enforcement weak, and international indicators on the facility for doing business 
continuously low. This situation bears the traces of a tumultuous past, the legacy of 
colonization, dictatorship, and war. In this light, the preparatory legal intervention 
was derisory. Its achievement was less to transform the administration than to 
demonstrate a commitment to REDD+ and maintain the ministry of environment in 
donors’ field of vision. Over time in Kinshasa, it became clear that REDD+ would be 
mostly funded through their support. For example, the forest carbon concession 
obtained in 2011 by the Canadian conservation organization was incorporated into a 
broader programme that the World Bank was supposed to finance according to result-
based rules (FCPF 2016). The ministry also secured multilateral aid funding to invest 
in productive activities targeting deforestation drivers like charcoal production (CIF 
2011), while the timber sector was also expecting to receive foreign support to adopt 
sustainable practices and be relieved from a moratorium on new logging rights. These 
actions, their financial transactions and commercial prospects would seldom translate 
into the exchange of CO2 offsets. More heterogeneous REDD+-related activities were 
emerging, again amid friction. For example, if the land near Kinshasa was relatively 
suitable for reforestation (despite the poor offsetting performance of the acacias 
plantation mentioned earlier), farther away the flora and fauna of the savannah were 
more diverse and local organizations were wary of the envisioned charcoal-producing 
plantations. The future of the logging economy was another contentious topic. 
Exploiting new forest areas, even sustainably, could liberate large amounts of carbon 
stored underground in peat lands whose existence has only been recently discovered 
(Lewis et al. 2017). These debates differed from the market/non-market antagonism 
of UN negotiations in the early 2010s. They indicate that if the CO2 problem ought to 
be taken seriously, other markets (charcoal, timber, etc.) and habits (a certain 
developmentalist attitude towards forests or their carbon) would need to be acted 
upon. 
In this last marketization site (the Congolese ministry of environment), we see 
that the carbon stored by forests amounted to a new natural resource situated within 
national borders. It was drawn into the (dis)functioning of what appears to be a fragile 
state, at least when compared to an idealized version of proper administration. Beside 
metrological equivalence (cf. MacKenzie 2009a), the marketization of forest carbon 
also involves legal interventions and expected moral standards about the practices of 
public and private sectors, expectations that the Congo failed to meet. This story, 
which now comes to an end, nevertheless suggests that the global visibility of 
Congolese forests acquired through REDD+, together with the limited reach of carbon 
markets on these landscapes, has had some potentially valuable effects. It notably 
seems to call out for transforming the economic flows in which the earthly life of 
trees in the tropics is entangled. 
 
Conclusion 
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The paper opened with the statement that carbon dioxide released from the burning of 
fossil fuels is a major concern of our times. It can be argued that the events related 
here have contributed to this state of affairs. Carbon markets and their minimal 
intervention seemed to have gradually normalized the injunction that CO2 ought not 
to be emitted without restriction, even from forest loss in the poorest parts of the 
world, such as the Congo. After having traced how the marketization of forest carbon 
evolved within and beyond UN negotiations, we can now suggest that this market 
arrangement is better understood as transitory action rather than some ultimate 
solution to global warming. The marketization process in focus has probably had a 
derisory direct effect on the global level of CO2. It may even seem to have animated a 
process of cheapening nature, which some have argued is contributing to the problem 
of global warming (cf. Moore 2015). But, as my story implies, the ongoing marginal 
existence of carbon offsetting can claim other ramifications (e.g. drawing worldwide 
attention to the carbon stored in the Congo Basin) that could have future positive 
impacts on the Earth’s climate. 
To examine how forest carbon became enrolled in market exchanges, the 
paper adopted a logistical sensibility to move across four marketization sites, different 
places and times in which the marketization of CO2 absorbed by trees in the tropics 
could be seen to be at stake. We first looked at the early years of UN negotiations on 
climate change, when the problem of CO2 emissions only started becoming an issue, 
notably through the devising of forms of market exchange that led to a long dispute 
about the suitability of forest carbon for these transactions. We then focused on one of 
the few forestry activities authorized to produce offsets, a plantation in the Congolese 
savannah set up in the late 2000s and framed by UN metrological requirements, 
before being threatened by the recalcitrant behaviour of trees. Our third marketization 
site was the UN negotiation process again, when in the mid 2000s a new topic 
emerged around tropical deforestation and its emissions that revived the dispute about 
marketization. CO2 meanwhile started to be considered a more encompassing 
problem, rather than simply a matter of quantification and offsets. Finally, we went 
back to the Congo, this time in the ministry of environment, where overseas aid 
consultants were busy giving forest carbon a legal existence to enable moralized 
offsetting transactions. Though the latter did not really materialize, the preparatory 
intervention contributed to make the carbon stored in Congolese forests more visible 
in Kinshasa and beyond. The story thus suggests that the marketization of forest 
carbon has been shaped and often impaired and impeded through frictions taking 
different forms, from the unruliness of earthly life and disruptions caused by mundane 
details to legacies from the past and failed universality. 
Presented together these four episodes of the problematic marketization of 
forest carbon indicate a series of operations to compose a market designed and 
maintained to address a public problem. We saw the importance of political 
negotiation in establishing demand for the new good, whose exchange is meant to 
respond to the problem at issue. We witnessed the tension between rigid metrological 
conventions regulating the production of the good and flexible financial commitments 
required to attract and maintain investors in the productive activity. We encountered 
moral expectations regarding who and how the new resource could be appropriated to 
be made productive and become an object of marketization. For each of these 
operations, we attended to what has been carried out, always through friction, never 
from scratch or in a vacuum. I called this approach a focus on the mundane. This 
focus helped me highlight some features of the globalized world, where carbon 
emissions are now a major concern; these features include the consensus-based 
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diplomacy of the United Nations, the ideal of accountable states and moralized 
economies, unequal access to scientific infrastructures, and a developmentalist 
conception of nature. To address the problem of global warming, this world needs to 
change. Here, I would like to suggest that a way forward might be to better 
acknowledge the friction of the mundane, that is, the myriad resistances, reluctances, 
disruptions, and dilemmas brought about by this need to change. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. The numbers are retrieved from: http://www.cdmpipeline.org/cdm-projects-
type.htm. The CDM online database can be accessed here: 
https://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/projsearch.html. 
2. In UN negotiations, REDD+ refers to policy approaches and positive incentives on 
issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation; and 
the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of 
forest carbon stocks in developing countries. 
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République démocratique du Congo (MECNT), 2010, July. Readiness plan for REDD 
2010–2012, R-PP Final Version. Available from: 
https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/democratic-republic-congo [Accessed 4 
January 2016]. 
Mitchell, T., 2011. Carbon democracy: political power in the age of oil. London: 
Verso. 
Moore, J.W., 2015. Capitalism in the web of life: ecology and the accumulation of 
capital. London: Verso Books. 
Moura-Costa, P. and Stuart, M.D., 1998. Forestry-based greenhouse gas mitigation: a 
story of market evolution. The Commonwealth Forestry Review, 77 (3), 191–202. 
Muniesa, F., et al., 2017. Capitalization: a cultural guide. Paris: Presses des Mines. 
Nel, A., 2017. Contested carbon: carbon forestry as a speculatively virtual, falteringly 
material and disputed territorial assemblage. Geoforum, 81, 144–152. 
Osborne, T., 2015. Tradeoffs in carbon commodification: a political ecology of 
common property forest governance. Geoforum, 67, 64–77. 
  
20 
Price Waterhouse Cooper (PWC), 2011, October. Implementing REDD+ in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo How to manage the risk of corruption. Norwegian 
Agency for Development Cooperation, Price Waterhouse Cooper, Libreville. 
Available from: http://www.redd-monitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/NORAD-
PwC- Implementing-REDD-in-DRC-Corruption-risks-NORAD-Final-Version-E.pdf 
Riles, A., 2001. The network inside out. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan. 
Stern, N., 2007. The economics of climate change: the stern review. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Tsing, A.L., 2005. Friction: an ethnography of global connection. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 2005, 
November. Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries: 
approaches to stimulate action: Submissions from Parties. FCCC/CP/2005/MISC.1. 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 2014, June. 
Key decisions relevant for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation in developing countries (REDD+). Bonn: UNFCCC Secretariat. 
Werksman, J., 1998. The clean development mechanism: unwrapping the ‘Kyoto 
surprise’. Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law, 7 
(2), 147–158. 
Weszkalnys, G., 2011. Cursed resources, or articulations of economic theory in the 
Gulf of Guinea. Economy and Society, 40 (3), 345–372. 
 
